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Umberger: Distributed Generation

DISTRIBUTED GENERATION: HOW
LOCALIZED ENERGY PRODUCTION
REDUCES VULNERABILITY TO
OUTAGES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DAMAGE IN THE WAKE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE

ALLYSON UMBERGER *
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, our nation’s energy infrastructure faced a mighty challenge
when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast. More than 1.7 million
people in the Gulf states lost power, and it took utility companies several
weeks to restore service to their customers. 1 Five years later, disaster
struck again when an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil
rig released 205.8 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. 2 The
environmental disaster devastated the Gulf Coast and brought the
region’s offshore oil operations, as well as its fishing and tourism

* Doctor of Jurisprudence Candidate 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law; B.S., University
of Southern California Marshall School of Business (2010). The author would like to thank each
individual who contributed their time and effort to this Comment, including her faculty advisor,
Brian Orion, for his inspiration; her associate editor, Marrianne Sioson, for her dedication; and the
entire Golden Gate University School of Law Environmental Law Journal editorial board and staff
for their hard work towards the publication of this edition. She would also like to give special thanks
to her parents, siblings, Tyler and the Browne family for their support and encouragement.
1
NAT’L
OCEANIC
&
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.,
HURRICANE
KATRINA,
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/special-reports/katrina.html (last updated Dec. 29, 2005).
2
NAT’L
OCEANIC
&
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.,
GULF
OIL
SPILL,
www.education.noaa.gov/Ocean_and_Coasts/Oil_Spill.html (last updated Apr. 10, 2011). See
Jeremy Repanich, The Deepwater Horizon Spill by The Numbers, POPULAR MECHANICS (Aug. 10,
2010, 12:39 PM), www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/bp-oil-spill-statistics.

183

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

1

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 10

184

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 6

industries, to a standstill. 3
These monumental disasters sounded alarms, warning us that our
country’s centralized, large-scale power grids, running primarily on coal,
natural gas and oil, were all too prone to catastrophic failure. With the
aftermath of natural disasters only worsening as a result of climate
change, 4 every region in America is susceptible to blackouts. 5 The
Midwest battles tornadoes for half the year and winter storms for the
other half, 6 while seismologists postulate that the West Coast is long
overdue for an earthquake akin to Chile’s 8.8-magnitude quake of 2010
and Japan’s 9.0-magnitude quake of 2011. 7 Natural disasters of all
degrees are often accompanied by widespread blackouts and fallen
power lines, the effects of which may be felt for weeks by a nation that
relies so heavily on electricity. 8
Unfortunately, natural disasters are not the only cause of massive
blackouts. 9 In September 2010, a downed transmission line between
Arizona and Southern California left nearly five million people without
electricity in the face of record-high temperatures in Arizona, California,
and Mexico. 10 These accidental outages are merely a symptom of a much
larger problem: a poorly configured infrastructure that wastes energy and
underutilizes valuable resources. At the capstone of the infrastructure’s
pyramid of problems is the troublesome truth that our reliance on
exhaustible energy sources cannot sustain itself in the face of climate
change and a perpetually-increasing international demand for energy. 11
3

See Harold F. Upton, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
THE GULF OF MEXICO FISHING INDUSTRY (Feb. 17, 2011), available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41640.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AMERICA’S GULF COAST: A
LONG TERM RECOVERY PLAN AFTER THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL (Sept. 2010), available
at www.epa.gov/indian/pdf/mabus-report.pdf.
4
See generally Climate Change, Worsening the Aftermath of Natural Disasters?, THE
HUMANITARIAN FORUM, (Sept. 18, 2010), www.humanitarianforum.org/news.php/en/64/climatechange-worsening-the-aftermath-of-natural-disasters.
5
See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., PHYSICAL VULNERABILITY OF ELECTRIC
SYSTEMS TO NATURAL DISASTERS AND SABOTAGE 9–14 (June 1990), available at
www.fas.org/ota/reports/9034.pdf.
6
Id.
7
E.g., Susanne Rust, Is California Next in Line for Big Quake?, CALIFORNIA WATCH, CTR.
FOR
INVESTIGATIVE
REPORTING
(Mar.
16,
2011),
available
at
californiawatch.org/dailyreport/california-next-line-big-quake-9242.
8
See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 5, at ch. 3.
9
E.g., Southern California Hit by Major Power Failure, NBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2011, 1:21
AM),
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44446563/ns/us_news-life/t/southern-california-hit-major-powerfailure/#.TxN2lvmwUQ8.
10
Id.
11
See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 28–31 (Emily Carleton ed.,
2011) (discussing the shortsightedness of America’s reaction to the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in
April 2010, how the continuance of “dangerous oil drilling expeditions in remote terrains yield an
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America’s outdated and problematic energy model requires drastic
change, which can be accomplished by replacing massive power plants
with localized energy production and delivery through a method known
as distributed generation. 12 Distributed generation (DG) 13 is a selfsufficient energy production model that uses small-scale renewable
energy sources to generate enough electricity to fuel individual
demand. 14 Most notably, DG opens the door for the democratic
participation of individuals who own and desire to own DG technologies
to meet their own demands for electricity—upending the electrical utility
industry’s “natural monopoly” model that has drained ratepayers for
decades. 15
A modernized energy policy maximizing the use of renewable
energy would make renewable energy more accessible to individual
citizens. 16 At the individual level, incentive-driven DG policies make
renewable energy technologies more economically attractive and
profitable for the ratepayer. 17 On a larger scale, DG could enable
America’s densely populated urban communities to supply their own
energy demand by making energy generation (supply) part of the
interconnected urban community itself. 18 The vast potential that DG
holds for improving the country’s energy infrastructure has gone
untapped, but the international fight over oil, 19 national goals for
domestic energy security and self-reliance, 20 and the advancement of
technology that is available for renewable energy growth all present
America with a great opportunity for change. 21
This Comment breaks down the working parts of America’s energy
infrastructure, assessing how the current model could be converted into
one that is more efficient, cost effective, and environmentally
sustainable. It looks beyond general energy legislation, focusing

insignificant amount of oil at best,” and how “oil will continue to flow but at dwindling rates and
higher costs”).
12
VA. TECH, CONSORTIUM ON ENERGY RESTRUCTURING, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION ch. 1.3
(2007), www.dg.history.vt.edu/ch1/benefits.html.
13
A table of acronyms is included at the end of this Comment for ease of reference.
14
VA. TECH, supra note 12.
15
Id.
16
See generally BILL POWERS & SHEILA BOWERS, DISTRIBUTED SOLAR PV—WHY IT
SHOULD BE THE CENTERPIECE OF U.S. SOLAR ENERGY POLICY (Sept. 10, 2010), available at
solar.ehclients.com/images/uploads/dist_solar_pv_centerpiece_of_us_solar_policy.pdf.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
See generally JAMES DIGEORGIA, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR OIL (2005).
20
See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, BLUEPRINT FOR A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE (Mar. 30,
2011), available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/blueprint_secure_energy_future.pdf.
21
Id.
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specifically on chartered, proposed, and failed energy legislation in
California. Part II of this Comment examines the weaknesses of
America’s current energy infrastructure, looking at the history of the
energy industry and the nation’s resulting reluctance to adopt renewable
technologies despite the shortcomings of the current model. Part III
presents DG and expands upon the potential it possesses to empower
Americans in a democratic movement to reinvent their energy
infrastructure. Part IV explores how energy policy and its legal
implications at all levels have hindered the success of DG, and how those
policies could be improved to better support DG development. Part V
examines the roll of California’s agencies in promoting and enforcing the
State’s DG policies, focusing on specific successes and failures. Part VI
looks to other countries that have successfully integrated distributed
generation into their national energy strategies, and suggests specific
legal and structural changes necessary to make DG successful in the
United States. The Conclusion presents an overarching goal for the
future of DG, renewable energy, and energy infrastructures both in the
United States and abroad.
II.

AMERICA’S RELIANCE ON CENTRALIZED POWER

During the Second Industrial Revolution, America prospered into an
industrial and economic superpower, using cheap oil to fuel its engines.22
As a result, Americans quickly became addicted to the seemingly
limitless energy that oil had to offer. 23 For decades, the industrial
engine—and the American economy—ran smoothly, well-lubricated by
oil. 24 Then, in 2008, oil prices hit a record $147.27 per barrel. 25 The
price spike set off an economic meltdown that quickly enveloped the
world, and America was forced to look elsewhere to fuel the economic
engine. 26
America’s centralized energy system is modeled on large-scale
refineries and plants that are most often sited far from the city centers to
which they supply electricity. 27 These plants are powered primarily by

22

RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 23.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.; Christopher Johnson, Timeline: Half a Century of Oil Price Volatility, REUTERS (Nov.
20,
2008,
11:02
AM),
www.reuters.com/article/2008/11/20/us-oil-pricesidUKTRE4AJ3ZR20081120.
26
See RIFKIN, supra note 11.
27
VA. TECH, CONSORTIUM ON ENERGY RESTRUCTURING, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION ch. 1.1
(2007), www.dg.history.vt.edu/ch1/introduction.html.
23
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combustion fuels, including oil, natural gas, and coal. 28 Since the utility
companies contractually control many of the country’s combustion fuel
plants and connecting transmission lines, utilities can provide electricity
to massive, regional markets, creating natural monopolies where
consumers have no choice among service providers. 29 For many
ratepayers, the location is everything—each utility company services a
designated area. 30 In California, the investor-owned utilities have divvied
up the land into three major and a few minor jurisdictions. 31 This
jurisdiction scheme is an endgame in which the utilities control all the
pieces in play, moderated only slightly by federal agencies like the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 32 and state regulatory
commissions 33 with respect to market oversight, consumer/ratepayer
protection, permitting, and land-use regulation. 34 Furthermore, the longdistance transmission and distribution (T&D) system that keeps the
nation connected results in an average of seven percent of energy loss
every year, 35 which is no drop in the bucket for a country boasting a net
generation of 3,754,486,282 megawatt hours of electricity in 2010. 36 A
seven percent transmission loss in 2010 meant that 262,814,039.74
megawatt hours of power were wasted on electricity transmission and
distribution alone—that’s enough electricity to power more than twentyfour million American homes for an entire year. 37
Waste is not the only disadvantage of the centralized infrastructure.
The oil-driven mega-model results in substantial greenhouse gas

28

Id.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRICITY MARKETS: FERC’S ROLE IN PROTECTING
CONSUMERS (June 6, 2003), available at www.gao.gov/assets/100/91938.pdf.
30
See CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRIC INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES (IOUS), available at
www.energy.ca.gov/maps/serviceareas/CA_Electric_IOU.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2012).
31
Id.
32
See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, MARKET OVERSIGHT, www.ferc.gov/marketoversight/market-oversight.asp (last updated June 13, 2012).
33
See NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, REGULATORY COMMISSIONS,
www.naruc.org/commissions.cfm (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
34
See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 29.
35
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: HOW MUCH ELECTRICITY
IS
LOST
IN
TRANSMISSION
AND
DISTRIBUTION
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES?,
www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=105&t=3 (last updated July 9, 2012).
36
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATE ELECTRICITY PROFILES (Jan. 30, 2012),
www.eia.gov/electricity/state/.
37
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: HOW MUCH ELECTRICITY
DOES AN AMERICAN HOME USE?, www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=97&t=3 (last updated Dec. 6,
2012) (calculated by converting megawatt hours to kilowatt hours at one megawatt hour per 1,000
kilowatt hours, and dividing the converted rate by the average annual electricity consumption for a
U.S. residential utility consumer: 276,523,164,820kWh/11,496 kWh = 24,053,859.15274878, or
approximately twenty-four million homes).
29
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emissions, 38 environmental disruption caused by the sheer footprint of
huge power plants and transmission lines, 39 and dangerous wastewater
and oil spills. 40 The oil industry and the regulatory bodies that oversee it
are both to blame for the damage caused by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
in Alaska in 1989, 41 the harsh effects of the Cosco Busan Oil Spill in the
San Francisco Bay in 2007, 42 and the monumental disaster of the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. 43 The
Deepwater Horizon disaster was a direct result of a lack of regulatory
oversight of the drilling industry. 44 Unfortunately, spills are not the only
manifestations of oil’s environmentally harmful effects. On September 9,
2010, a Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) natural gas pipeline exploded in
San Bruno, California, revealing a gas pipeline’s destructive capabilities
and the extreme inadequacy of safety regulations in California. 45 In
response to the incident, the California Public Utilities Commission
forced PG&E to examine its entire network, and PG&E discovered
thirty-eight pipelines that were leaking gas into the environment. 46 All of
these events represent the ugly side-effects of American reliance on
fossil fuels and an outdated energy model. Nevertheless, because of a
historical reliance on oil, Americans continue to expect oil—an
exhaustible resource—to meet their ever-increasing energy demands. 47
The reality is that international energy demand is quickly surpassing oil
supply, and countries with indefinite plans to rely primarily on oil are
destined for a rude awakening well within the lifespan of the current
38

NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., GLOBAL WARMING: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS no. 2, www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/globalwarming.html (last updated Aug. 20, 2008).
39
See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OIL: ELECTRICITY FROM OIL,
www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/oil.html (last updated Dec. 28, 2007).
40
Id.
41
Bill Mintz, Report Fixes Blame for Alaskan Oil Spill/Captain, Exxon, Coast Guard
HOUSTON
CHRON.,
Aug.
1,
1990,
at
A1,
available
at
Faulted,
www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1990_719914/report-fixes-blame-for-alaskan-oil-spillcaptain-e.html.
42
Henry K. Lee, Feds Find Fault All Around in Cosco Busan Spill, SFGATE (May 8, 2009
4:00
AM),
www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Feds-find-fault-all-around-in-Cosco-Busan-spill3162084.php.
43
Brittan J. Bush, Addressing the Regulatory Collapse Behind the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill: Implementing a “Best Available Technology” Regulatory Regime for Deepwater Oil
Exploration Safety and Cleanup Technology, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 535, 545–48 (2011)
(discussing regulatory failure under the Continental Shelf Lands Act).
44
Id.
45
Joan Lowy, San Bruno Explosion Report Released, Pacific Gas & Electric Fully Blamed,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2011, 5:50 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/26/san-brunoexplosion-report-ntsb-pacific-gas-electric_n_982098.html.
46
E.g., John Upton, PG&E Inspection Finds 38 Gas Leaks, BAY CITIZEN (Oct. 25, 2010,
8:53 PM), www.baycitizen.org/pge/story/pge-finds-38-gas-leaks-first-phase/.
47
See RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 28-30.
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generation. 48
When the energy crisis began sweeping the globe in the 1970s,
renewable energies peeked out from behind experimental curtains. 49
With each passing year, renewable technologies become more accessible
and more affordable. 50 Modern renewables, namely solar, wind, and
hydro power, promise exceptional benefits. Most notably, renewable
technologies provide potentially inexhaustible sources of energy
production. 51 In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis and spiking oil
prices, America is considering how to implement renewables into its
energy infrastructure, but true progress first requires an
acknowledgement that the current model needs to be replaced in its
entirety with something better suited to modern and sustainable living. 52
III. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION: AN OVERVIEW
Distributed generation is an energy production method that creates
energy close to its point of consumption. 53 Small-scale renewable energy
technologies, such as rooftop solar panels and small wind turbines,
harness energy that is then turned into electricity by small, modular
generators. 54 The result is a more reliable, secure source of energy that
provides electricity without many of the negative consequences of our
current model. 55 Additionally, those who supply their own energy using
DG have the added benefit of selling surplus energy to an integrated
smart grid when their production surpasses their demand. 56 The option to
sell surplus energy reduces the risk of energy waste by providing

48

Id. at 15 (referencing The International Energy Agency’s 2010 World Energy Outlook
report, which concluded that “global peak production of crude oil probably occurred in 2006 at
seventy million barrels per day.”).
49
See generally DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF
THE MODERN WORLD (2011).
50
E.g., Eric Martinot & Janet Sawin, Renewable Global Status Report 2009 Update,
ENERGY
WORLD
(Sept.
9,
2009),
RENEWABLE
www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/09/renewables-global-status-report-2009update.
51
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., LEARNING ABOUT RENEWABLE ENERGY,
www.nrel.gov/learning/re_basics.html (last updated May 18, 2012).
52
See RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 70–72 (discussing “The Checklist” of Rifkin’s five pillars
that make up the revolutionized infrastructure).
53
VA. TECH, supra note 27, at ch. 1.1.
54
Id.
55
Id. (e.g., energy lost in transmission and the environmental impacts of large power plants).
56
CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA,
www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/ (last updated Dec. 23, 2010). See also CAL. PUB. UTILS.
COMM’N,
NET
SURPLUS
COMPENSATION
(AB
920),
www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/netsurplus.htm (last updated Oct. 4, 2011).
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consumers with the financial motivation to make sure that all energy that
is produced is used, either in their own homes or by other consumers. 57
As a result, energy consumers can become less reliant on the utility
companies and are finally given options that elude them in the current
system. 58 Perhaps most importantly, DG enables consumers to choose
from a variety of small-scale renewable energy options. 59
The biggest roadblock DG faces is a sheer lack of policy support. 60
Energy policy, primarily Title XIII of the Federal Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007, dictates the regulation of the utility companies,
the composition of our electricity generation mix, and which government
entity is responsible for each component of the sector. 61 While there are
a handful of supplemental policies already in place for renewable energy
in general—even distributed generation in particular—these rules and
regulations are restricted by the old paradigm for energy production,
which places a heavy emphasis on large-scale power plants and powerful
utilities. 62 Add to the mix years of regulation, deregulation, and
reinstituted regulation of the energy sector, and the laws controlling our
energy infrastructure have become so muddled and inconsistent that
renewable energy and distributed generation are barely affected by the
policies intended to promote clean and sustainable energy. 63
This inconsistency in support stems primarily from the hierarchical
structure of the nation’s energy policy. 64 While the United States
President’s Energy Policy and federal legislation supposedly reign
supreme, state and local governments have passed numerous overlapping
laws that differ from federal legislation, creating quite the legislative

57

See Tiffany Hsu, Schwarzenegger Signs 2 Renewable Energy Bills, Vetoes Others, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2009), available at articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/13/business/fi-solar13.
58
Id.
59
CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 56
(examples of small scale renewable energy sources include solar photovoltaic panels, small wind
turbines, and fuel cell cells).
60
See Erica Gies, Distributed Generation: Key Part of Our Energy Future—Phil Harris,
GREEN
TECH
(June
30,
2011,
2:39
PM),
FORBES:
www.forbes.com/sites/ericagies/2011/06/30/distributed-generation-key-part-of-our-energy-futurephil-harris/ (referring to administrative and bureaucratic barriers).
61
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LEGISLATION: ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT
OF 2007, SMARTGRID.GOV, www.smartgrid.gov/federal_initiatives/legislation (last visited July 22,
2012).
62
See Gies, supra note 60.
63
See generally VA. TECH, CONSORTIUM ON ENERGY RESTRUCTURING, DISTRIBUTED
GENERATION ch. 1.2 (2007), www.dg.history.vt.edu/ch1/history.html (explaining a history of
increasingly complicated and overlapping energy policy, namely in California).
64
See generally Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption when There Is an
“Emerging Consensus” of State Environmental Laws and Policies, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 649 (2008),
available at www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/v102/n2/649/LR102n2Learner.pdf.
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mess. 65 Meanwhile, the regulatory agencies that provide policy
guidelines and assistance base their policy decisions on the need to
achieve goals, rather than on how the government, the utilities, and the
public should work together to achieve those goals. 66 This goal-oriented
policy is problematic because it ignores the intangible benefits that can
come from distributed generation. 67 Most importantly, DG’s reliable,
secure, and close-to-home energy production capabilities vastly reduce
the system’s vulnerability to massive power outages 68 while, at the same
time, reducing the environmental impacts that large-scale plants and
extensive transmission lines have on valuable land. 69
Even with DG’s many benefits, the technology cannot reach its full
potential without the support of infrastructure and pro-DG policy. 70
Unfortunately, the technology is unappealing to those regulating the
energy sector and the utility companies that provide nearly all American
with their electricity. 71 Consequently, energy policy is severely lacking
in support for DG, and its benefits for the ratepayer remain untapped. 72
IV. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION MAXIMIZATION AND WHAT IS
HOLDING IT BACK
When maximized in an urban setting, DG can provide many
benefits to the community and to the environment. 73 At the individual

65

Id.
See generally AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ET. AL., CALIFORNIA CLEAN
ENERGY FUTURE, MEETING CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS IN THE ELECTRIC
POWER
SECTOR
IN
2020
AND
BEYOND
(Nov.
9,
2011),
www.cacleanenergyfuture.org/documents/All_Metrics.pdf (plans are goal-oriented rather than
focused on agency cooperation).
67
AMORY B. LOVINS, SMALL IS PROFITABLE: THE HIDDEN ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION (AND OTHER DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES) 42–43 (2002), available at
www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/U01-13_SmallIsProfitable (discussing how policies focus
on the wrong “rewards” rather than focusing on benefits to the society at large).
68
U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFIT OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND
RATE-RELATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION: A STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION
1817
OF
THE
ENERGY
POLICY
ACT
OF
2005
2.1-2.17
(Feb.
2007),
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/1817_Report_-final.pdf.
69
See generally SOLAR DONE RIGHT, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF LARGE-SCALE SOLAR
PROJECTS (Sept. 9, 2010), available at solar.ehclients.com/images/uploads/env_impacts_of_lgscale_solar_projects.pdf (citing impacts that large scale plants have on the environment).
70
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 68.
71
Id. at ii-iv.
72
Id.
73
See generally CRAIG LEWIS, CLEAN COAL., DISTRIBUTED GENERATION + SMART GRID:
SUCCESS DEPENDS ON SIGNIFICANT INTERCONNECTION REFORM (2011), available at
www.energy.ca.gov/2011_energypolicy/documents/2011-0622_workshop/presentations/20_Craig_Lewis_-_CA_Clean_Coalition.pdf.
66
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level, DG offers an individual the opportunity to become an energy
entrepreneur who can attract capital and equity into an investment that
benefits the community at large. 74 By producing local energy that is
cheaper (based on mandated, fixed rates), more reliable, and more
secure, distributed generation systems have enormous potential to pay for
themselves with a quick rate of return. 75 By adding upfront financial
incentives and energy or financial credits for contributing electricity to
the smart grid, DG systems could pay for themselves even sooner. 76
On a larger scale, DG can drive employment and generate tax
revenue at virtually no cost to the government. 77 Diverting the cost can
be accomplished by making solar panel and wind turbine manufacturers
responsible for one hundred percent of distribution grid (D-grid) upgrade
costs without any need for reimbursement from the government. 78 For
example, when a solar panel manufacturer improves its technology, it
could be held responsible for replacing its customers’ panels with the
new panels at no cost to the customer and without financial support from
the government. 79 New and localized jobs will be created for the design,
manufacture, installation, and connection of solar panels and other
renewable technologies and for the smart grid, all of which offers the
great potential of strengthening local economies while, at the same time,
bringing domestic energy production to the forefront of our energy
infrastructure.
In addition to economic benefits, the use of DG and a smart grid,
which manages DG-contributions virtually, can enable local systems to
reduce their peak loads (i.e., high periods of demand, such as early
morning and dinnertime) by having consumers meet their own demand. 80
This method, known as “demand response,” is highly favored in energy
procurement planning because it prevents utilities from providing more
energy than is demanded at a given time, which reduces the amount of
wasted energy. 81 Demand response systems can thrive with DG because
consumers can manage their own periods of high demand without utility

74

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6, 10.
76
Id. (showing how California’s DG incentive programs expedite the payback of investments
in DG technologies).
77
Id. at 6, 15.
78
Id. at 15.
79
Id.
80
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 68, at 4.
81
FED. REGULATORY ENERGY COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND
RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING 11 (rev. Dec. 2008), available at www.ferc.gov/legal/staffreports/demand-response.pdf.
75
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oversight. 82 DG also allows consumers to provide ancillary services such
as reactive power and voltage support, and the technology improves
overall power quality and reliability for consumers connected to the
smart grid. 83 With urbanization on the rise, this type of smart
infrastructure is needed to support massive populations. DG provides
energy security when traditional, vulnerable grids crash; price stability
immune to utility manipulation; less demand for utility-scale energy; and
fewer or zero emissions coming from the renewable energy sources for
distributed generation. 84
All of these potential benefits raise the question of why our energy
system is so behind in employing this option. First and foremost, the
current regulatory scheme is extremely unfavorable to DG. 85 This is
because investor-owned-utilities (IOUs) such as California’s Pacific Gas
& Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego
Gas & Electric (SDG&E) do not profit from DG programs. 86 It is no
coincidence that their reasons for being against DG are the same reasons
why consumers would profit from DG because when consumers begin to
meet their own demand, they gain control over production, and the IOUs
lose control. 87 Another cause for IOU concern is the fact that utilities are
relatively unfamiliar with DG technologies, or at least they pretend to be,
which creates an air of uncertainty and risk that make it unattractive to
utility companies. 88 Between uncertain risks, a lack of experience with
DG, and the prospect of having to abandon their profitable business
models, utility companies have generated little to no data, models, or
analytical tools for evaluating DG systems. 89 In turn, this lack of data
makes utilities even more wary of DG. 90 This self-fulfilling prophecy has
led utilities away from DG, even though state commissions like
California’s Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) attempt to promote
DG’s potential for helping our energy crisis. 91 Unfortunately, under the
structure of California’s current system, the IOUs have so much
bargaining power in the legislative process that nothing short of the

82

Id. at 11, 12.
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 68, at 4.
84
See Gies, supra note 60 (promoting DG’s many benefits for urban communities).
85
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 68, at 1-4.
86
Id. at 3-4.
87
Id. at 4.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC Approves Feed-in Tariffs to
Support Development of Onsite Renewable Generation (Feb. 14, 2008), available at
docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/NEWS_RELEASE/78824.htm.
83
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Governor issuing a declaratory order will force them to fully implement
DG systems into urban smart grids. 92
With the energy hierarchy at a regulatory standstill, hope lies
primarily in the hands of those who live in our nation’s urban
communities. 93 The urban habitat is a crucial one, given that more than
half of the world’s population lives tightly packed into urban
environments with high demands for energy, water, and food. 94
According to a published study by Professor Mat Santamouris of the
National & Kapodistrian University of Athens, the Save Programme of
the European Commission estimated that ninety percent of the United
States’ population will be concentrated in urban habitats by 2050. 95 By
2100, eight percent of the world’s total population will be living in urban
environments. 96 Increased urbanization has led to an increased demand
for energy security, 97 and distributed generation has great potential to
meet this urban demand. With urban habitats becoming more prevalent
in modern society, it is of utmost importance to make such communities
self-sustaining. 98
To start, the federal government must initiate a shift in the current
power structure that will open the door for DG, effectively upending the
current hierarchical order and empowering people to develop their own
strategies to meet their energy needs. DG systems provide renewable
energy that is both efficient and cost-effective. 99 Of course, handing such
powerful reins over to local communities may be difficult for federal or
state governments, but the current hierarchy does not seem to be doing
the job very well, either. 100
To many, it is no secret that the greatest cause of the hierarchical
conflict is the nation’s current energy policy. 101 Phil Harris, CEO of the
American interconnection company Tres Amigas LLC, 102 said it best:

92

Id.
DAVID GERSHON, EMPOWERMENT INST., STRATEGIES AND TOOLS FOR BEHAVIOR
CHANGE, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, AND THE REINVENTION OF OUR CITIES (2011), available at
www.empowermentinstitute.net/lcd/lcd_files/LCD_Empowering_Citizens_v1.ppt (David Gershon,
author of Social Change 2.0, discusses how community-wide change jumpstart the energy
infrastructure makeover).
94
MAT SANTAMOURIS, ENERGY AND CLIMATE IN THE URBAN BUILT ENVIRONMENT 4
(2001).
95
Id. at 5.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 8-10.
98
Id. at 14.
99
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 68.
100
Id.
101
Gies, supra note 60.
102
Tres Amigas, LLC, www.tresamigasllc.com/phillip-harris.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
93
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We’re not technology limited, we’re not software limited, we’re not
science limited. There are many devices out there that could add
value, but we need to upgrade the rules and regulations that are based
on the old paradigm to make them work with the needs and
technology that we have today. 103

It is evident that technology is not the problem, especially
considering that other countries are already utilizing lesstechnologically-advanced DG programs to their benefit. 104 In 2010,
Germany added roughly twenty-five times more solar than California,
even though California’s solar is more cost-efficient. 105 While
Germany’s weighted average Wholesale Distributed Generation (WDG)
solar rate is about $0.30 per kilowatt hour, the United States’ tax credits
and its solar resources (that is, hours of sunshine) decrease the price to
less than $0.12 per kilowatt hour. 106 For comparison, the entire country
of Germany receives an average of only 1,528 hours of sunshine per
year, which is less than a third of their total daylight hours, while the
sunny county of San Diego gets twice that amount. 107 So, with
technology and sunshine out of the equation, all that remains is the
daunting policy barrier. 108
Even in the progressive state of California, where distributed
generation programs are already in place, the policy-created investment
procedure is so time-consuming and costly that the technology is not
used to its full potential. 109 In order to improve the policy, it is necessary
to first understand the hierarchical structure that controls America’s
energy infrastructure. For this, we look to California, a state that has the
best potential—and the best chance—to lead the nation with a successful
DG model.

Tres Amigas, LLC, is a company focused on providing the first common interconnection of
America’s three power grids.
103
See Gies, supra note 60.
104
See LEWIS, supra note 73, at 8.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 10.
107
Mark Landler, Germany Debates Subsidies for Solar Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008,
available at www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/business/worldbusiness/16solar.html?pagewanted=all.
108
Gies, supra note 60.
109
See generally LEWIS, supra note 73, at 13 (stating that DG interconnection with California
IOUs takes two years, on average, with the default cluster process taking up to 3.5 years, while
SMUD does it in one fourth the time).
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CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR
SUCCESS

California has been leading the charge in renewable energy with its
high standards and ambitious goals for more than thirty years. 110
Following California’s deregulation of its wholesale electricity market in
1998 and the resulting energy crisis, 111 California passed AB 57
(amending California Public Utilities Code Section 454.5), 112 which
resurrected electricity procurement among the state’s IOUs. The
reinstitution of regulation came with a new rule, known as the LongTerm Procurement Plan (LTPP), which requires the CPUC to hold a
proceeding every two years to review and adopt the IOUs’ ten-year
procurement plans. 113 The purpose of the LTPP is to prevent future
energy crises in the State by requiring utilities to plan for energy
purchases ten years in advance. 114 CPUC must review and approve these
plans, making sure that the plans are consistent with the State’s energy
policies and renewable energy targets, beginning with the plan’s
compliance with the Energy Action Plan Loading Order. 115 The most
recent activity in the LTPP proceedings occurred on January 12, 2012, in
LTPP’s Rulemaking 10-05-006, when the CPUC voted unanimously to
change the LTPP Loading Order. 116 The Loading Order sets a priority
list of electricity sources for the utilities to use in their LTPPs, and this
recent rulemaking clarifies the Loading Order to require utilities to
exhaust their employment of energy efficiency and conservation,
followed by renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, geothermal
and even distributed generation before they may purchase any power
from fossil-fuel plants. 117 This modification goes hand-in-hand with
Governor Brown’s recent Senate Bill 2 (1x) (codified as Public Utilities

110

Cal.
Exec.
Order
No.
S-14-08
(Nov.
17,
2008),
available
at
gov38.ca.gov/index.php?/executive-order/11072/.
111
Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California’s
Restructuring Disaster, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 192-95 (2002) (describing California’s 1998
crisis),
deregulation
and
ensuing
web.archive.org/web/20060905020641/econ.ucsc.edu/faculty/lkletzer/borenstein_jepw02.pdf.
112
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454.5 (Westlaw 2012).
113
See
Long-Term
Procurement
Plan,
CAL.
PUB.
UTILS.
COMM’N,
www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Procurement/LTPP/ (last updated May 21, 2012).
114
Id.
115
Long-Term
Procurement
Plan,
CAL.
PUB.
UTILS.
COMM’N,
www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Procurement/LTPP/ (last updated May 21, 2012).
116
See CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION APPROVING MODIFIED BUNDLED
PROCUREMENT
PLANS
para.
5
(Jan.
12,
2012),
available
at
docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/AGENDA_DECISION/155719.htm.
117
Id.
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Code Section 399.11-399.31), 118 which requires retail sellers and
publicly-owned utilities to be producing thirty-three percent of their
energy via renewable sources by 2020. 119 The tension that the recent
rulemaking finally addressed was that utilities were only fulfilling the
bare minimum of their annual percentage goals with energy efficiency
and renewable energies, whereas now they must exhaust those resources
before considering fossil fuels. 120
CPUC’s January 2012 LTPP Loading Order decision is relief for a
state where complexity, coupled with a lack of cohesion amongst
California’s energy players, made SB 2 (1x) hard to decipher and even
harder to enact. 121 California recognizes the need to address many issues,
such as the need to streamline the siting, procurement, and permitting
processes related to energy infrastructure investments. 122 Unfortunately,
the three main state agencies responsible for energy policy are still
missing crucial coordination skills and the ability to engage California’s
stakeholders, mainly because they have a handful of other federal, state,
local, and regional entities to which they must answer. 123 The three
agencies responsible for this charge are the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC), the California Energy Commission (CEC), and the
California Independent Systems Operator (CAISO). 124 Additionally,
Governor Schwarzenegger signed AB 32 125 into law in 2006; which
requires the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to coordinate with
these agencies on energy activities. 126 Once you mix in the state’s three
powerhouse IOUs, PG&E, SDG&E, and SCE, 127 who have agendas of
their own (namely, remaining profitable), the state agencies barely have a

118

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 399.11-399.31 (Westlaw 2012).
CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD:
QUARTERLY
REPORT:
2ND
QUARTER
2011
(Aug.
1,
2011),
available
at
www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/1D24680C-BDF1-4EE9-A43F59B309602172/0/Q2ReporttotheLegislatureFINAL.pdf.
120
See CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION, supra note 116.
121
David Nahai, California’s SB X 1-2 Law Walks Renewable Energy Tightrope,
RENEWABLE
ENERGY
WORLD
(June
10,
2011),
available
at
www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/06/californias-sb-x-1-2-walks-renewableenergy-tightrope.
122
AIR RES. BD., ET. AL., supra note 66.
123
BAY AREA ECON. FORUM, CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY FUTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR AN
INTEGRATED
POWER
POLICY
18
exhibit
7
(Nov.
2002),
available
at
www.bayeconfor.org/pdf/CAenergyfuture.pdf.
124
CAL.
ENERGY
COMM’N,
WHO’S
WHO
IN
CALIFORNIA
ENERGY,
www.energy.ca.gov/newsroom/links.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
125
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38510 (Westlaw 2012).
126
See also, AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY ACTIVITIES,
www.arb.ca.gov/energy/energy.htm (last visited July 22, 2012).
127
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, WHO’S WHO, supra note 124.
119
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fighting chance. The result is a state with high hopes and imperfect
performance toward achieving its ambitious goals.
Understanding the existing disorder first requires understanding the
purpose of each government agency. First, the CPUC is an extremely
powerful commission that regulates utility services and the utility
infrastructure; its powers are vested directly by a California
constitutional amendment 128 and supplemented with powers from the
1912 Public Utilities Act. 129 With respect to DG, the CPUC regulates
policies and programs on both the consumer and the utility side of the
meter, with incentive and procurement programs, respectively. 130 These
programs include the California Solar Initiative, the Self-Generation
Incentive Program (SGIP), and the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
program. 131 In general, energy incentive programs like these are
designed to enable the consumer to contribute to the power grid while, at
the same time, receiving a financial or credit-based incentive for doing
so. 132
Next is the CEC, which is California’s primary energy policy and
planning agency. 133 The CEC is responsible for several goals, 134
including forecasting future statewide electricity needs, keeping
historical data on energy, and promoting energy efficiency and
conservation. 135 Each of the five divisions of the CEC carries out its own
proceedings to address issues applicable to its goals. 136
CAISO is a not-for-profit public-benefit corporation that has been
managing California’s transmission system since March 1998. 137
CAISO’s responsibility is to “keep the lights on” in California by making
sure that electricity needs are met by a competitive market. 138 It is
answerable mainly to FERC, although it frequently collides with CPUC’s
LTPP proceedings, since the transmission system consists primarily of

128

Cal. Const. Art. 12, § 6 (Westlaw 2012) (CPUC then referred to as the Railroad
Commission). See CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, PUC HISTORY & STRUCTURE,
www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/aboutus/puhistory.htm (last modified Oct. 29, 2007).
129
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE, D. 1, Pt. 1, Ch. 2 (Westlaw 2012).
130
CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 56.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, www.energy.ca.gov/commission/overview.html (last visited Nov.
21, 2011).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, WHO’S WHO, supra note 124.
138
CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, ABOUT US, www.caiso.com/about/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited July 22, 2012).
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IOU transmission lines. 139
Finally, CARB is a division of the California Environmental
Protection Agency (CalEPA). CARB’s mission is to ensure that air
pollution control rules and regulations are implemented and enforced for
any energy policy in California. 140 In 2000, CARB adopted a distributed
generation certification program, which was required under Senate Bill
1298. 141 The program requires manufacturers that sell DG technologies
to meet emissions standards. 142
Collectively, these agencies serve to promote the most energyefficient policies and ensure passage, implementation, and enforcement
of those policies. However, the overlapping system is far from
straightforward or simple and poses many conflicts. 143
In 2010, CPUC, CEC, CAISO, CARB and CalEPA, together with
the Office of the Governor, drafted an ambitious plan for California’s
Clean Energy Future. 144 Each agency contributed its own report to the
Plan. 145 Collectively, the reports make up the State’s Clean Energy
Future Implementation Plan (“the Plan”). 146 The Plan consists of many
separate clean energy goals, including a target of 5,000 megawatts (MW)
139

CAL.
INDEP.
SYS.
OPERATOR,
REGULATORY
RULES,
www.caiso.com/rules/Pages/Regulatory/Default.aspx (last visited July 22, 2012).
140
AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY ACTIVITIES,
www.arb.ca.gov/energy/energy.htm (last visited July 22, 2012).
141
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41514.10 (Westlaw 2012). See AIR RES. BD., CAL.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION PROGRAM, www.arb.ca.gov/energy/dg/dg.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
142
AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION PROGRAM,
www.arb.ca.gov/energy/dg/dg.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
143
BAY AREA ECON. FORUM, CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY FUTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR AN
INTEGRATED
POWER
POLICY
18
exhibit
7
(Nov.
2002),
available
at
www.bayeconfor.org/pdf/CAenergyfuture.pdf.
144
AIR RES. BD. ET. AL., supra note 66.
145
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO INTEGRATE
AND REFINE PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND CONSIDER LONG-TERM PROCUREMENT PLANS (May 13,
2010), available at docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/117903.pdf (CPUC’s final
decision in the 2012 LTPP, which contributed to the Implementation Plan); CAL. ENERGY COMM’N,
INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT (2010), www.energy.ca.gov/2010publications/CEC-1002010-001/CEC-100-2010-001-CMF.PDF (implemented into section 5.2.1 of the Implementation
ENERGY
COMM’N,
STRATEGIC
INVESTMENT
PLAN
(2009),
Plan);
CAL.
www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CEC-700-2009-011/CEC-700-2009-011-CTD.PDF
(implemented into section 6.2.1 of the Implementation Plan); CAL. ISO, ANNUAL TRANSMISSION
PLAN (2011), www.caiso.com/Documents/Board-approvedISO2010-2011TransmissionPlan.pdf
(implemented into section 6.2.2-6.2.6 of the Implementation Plan); AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
CLIMATE
CHANGE
SCOPING
PLAN
(2008),
available
at
www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted_scoping_plan.pdf (implemented into section 7 of
the Implementation Plan; CARB is a department of the CalEPA, so this represents both of these
agencies).
146
CALIFORNIA CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (Nov. 9, 2011),
www.cacleanenergyfuture.org/documents/CCEFImplementationPlan.pdf.
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of installed renewable distributed generation “at the right locations on the
power grid to support reliability and provide economic value.” 147 When
considered separately, the goals seem achievable by each agency’s
separate plan of attack. However, when viewed altogether and under the
lens of the agencies’ overlapping jurisdictions, the goals seem difficult to
achieve. 148
It is hard to see how each separate agency’s responsibilities fit into
the broad “energy future” picture that is painted by the Plan. 149 For
example, while suggesting that achieving its goals requires looking
“outside the box,” the Plan fails to mention which programs meet these
criteria. 150 Rather, the Plan states that it will allow room for new ideas
and be open to a multi-faceted and integrated approach to achieving its
goals. 151 More specifically, the Plan references Governor
Schwarzenegger’s Go Solar California and Small Generator Incentive
programs, explaining that the Programs are “aimed towards” removing
the barriers to behind-the-meter distributed generation like cost, installer
infrastructure, availability of financing for projects, and getting
consumers on board with DG. 152 What it fails to mention, however, is
how the programs would remove the barriers and what would happen
once they were gone. 153 All in all, the Plan makes empty promises
because of a lack of integration between all of the agencies. In other
words, all the pieces of the puzzle are there, but nobody has put them
together yet.
At first glance, it appears that Californians have multiple paths
available for investing in DG technologies. Applicants interested in DG
have four different options: (1) CPUC’s California Solar Initiative; (2)
SGIP; (3) CEC’s New Solar Homes Program; or (4) CEC’s Emerging

147

CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N,
CALIFORNIA’S
CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE,
www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Climate+Change/future.htm.
148
See generally CALIFORNIA CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (Nov. 9,
2011), www.cacleanenergyfuture.org/documents/CCEFImplementationPlan.pdf (in reference to the
Plan’s multiple statistical targets that, when viewed altogether, do not seem plausible, realistic, or
even in agreement with one another; for example, there are several different projections for demand
and for demand response results). See also CALIFORNIA CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE, IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN (Nov. 9, 2011), www.cacleanenergyfuture.org/documents/CCEFRoadmap.pdf (showing just
how overlapping and complicated the agencies’ goals are when viewed altogether).
149
See generally CALIFORNIA CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (Nov. 9,
2011), www.cacleanenergyfuture.org/documents/CCEFImplementationPlan.pdf.
150
Id. See the Executive Summary for analysis of how drafting this report was approached by
the collaborating agencies.
151
AIR RES. BD. ET. AL., supra note 66.
152
CALIFORNIA CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, 56-60 (Nov. 9, 2011),
www.cacleanenergyfuture.org/documents/CCEFImplementationPlan.pdf.
153
Id.
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Renewables Program. 154 CPUC’s programs are supported by the
agency’s pro-DG policies, including Rule 21 Interconnection, which
enables eligible wholesale generators to connect DG systems to the
electric grid, and the Net Energy Metering policies that establish tariffs,
surplus compensation, credits, and credit transfer regulations for those
contributing energy to the grid. 155 The California Solar Initiative
program provides upfront incentives to California’s electricity utility
consumers who install solar electric systems on their homes, businesses,
or other public sites under the Initiative. 156 SGIP provides incentives to
those who install wind turbines, fuel cells, or energy storage systems for
wind turbines or fuel cells under that program. 157 CEC’s New Solar
Homes Program, a sister to the California Solar Initiative, provides solar
incentives for new residential construction that implements solar, and the
Emerging Renewables Program provides incentives for small to midsized
(less than thirty MW) wind and fuel cell systems in new construction. 158
Despite these seemingly favorable options, 159 DG is still heavily
undervalued in California. 160 The underutilization of this technology
stems from the continued use of a system that is very difficult to change
in a piecemeal fashion. Applicants interested in setting up DG sites must
complete a long application and contract process, jumping through hoops
created by overlapping and conflicting laws, rules, and regulations. Even
with the current options, roughly ninety-seven percent of the allotted bid
capacity for distributed generation fails to reach the contract stage due to
the slow, costly, and non-user-friendly interconnection process, which
can take up to four years to complete. 161 This means that, of the
permitted amount of projects that may be entered into across all options,
only three percent of applicants even reach the point at which they are
drafting contracts with CPUC and CEC’s programs. 162 Even fewer make
it to the point at which they are actually producing energy, receiving
incentives, and contributing their surplus production to the grid. 163 Given
these statistics, the agencies’ ambitious goals for innovations like DG

154

See generally CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION,
www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/ (last updated Dec. 23, 2010) (elaborating on California’s
DG programs).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
See Gies, supra note 60.
161
LEWIS, supra note 73, at 5, 13.
162
Id. at 5.
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Id.
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have left California with the need to achieve nineteen percent DG growth
per year to reach its renewable DG goal between 2012 and 2020. 164
Thus, an unnecessarily complicated system prevents interested
individuals from generating their own energy.
The DG system is further hindered by uneven bargaining power. 165
The IOUs have retained so much of the bargaining power in the
contracting stage that little to no advancement of these programs is
made. 166 Set with pre-defined terms and conditions, CPUC’s tariff
programs for small renewable generators come with non-negotiable
contracts between the consumer and the utility companies. 167 These set
contracts may be viewed as being easier for the consumer, but such
standard contracts typically favor the party that drafts them. 168
Additionally, the vast majority of what little renewable DG is installed
via these programs does not even contribute to the state’s Renewable
Portfolio Standard (RPS) targets, which keeps DG off the charts when
officials are measuring the State’s progress in its “[thirty-three percent]
renewables by 2020” goal. 169 This means that, even if DG were a viable
alternative, consumers are currently unable to see DG’s effects on
statewide reports, and the legislature has little evidence to support
additional pro-DG policies. 170 Even so, CPUC does have an open
proceeding, RPS docket R. 10-05-005, which could result in redefining
DG to make it eligible to contribute to RPS goals. 171 On the whole,
though, success for distributed generation can and will come only with a
drastic overhaul of the interconnection framework to make DG more
accessible and more appropriately valued.
Over the past few years, California has tried, and in a handful of
cases, has succeeded, in passing pro-DG legislation. A few examples of
this legislation include the following Senate Bills (SB) and Assembly

164

CALIFORNIA
CLEAN
ENERGY
FUTURE,
DISTRIBUTED
GENERATION,
www.cacleanenergyfuture.org/distributed-generation.html (last visited July 26, 2012) (assuming an
annual growth rate of about 7.5% between 2016 and 2020 to achieve the 12,000 MW goal and
accounting for the needed growth rate between 2012 and 2016).
165
Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, supra note 91.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CPUC-CEC COLLABORATIVE STAFF DATA REQUEST: INVITING
COMMENTS ON RENEWABLE DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN THE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD
PROGRAM 2 (Oct. 21, 2012), available at www.energy.ca.gov/portfolio/documents/documents/200310-21_STAFF_DATA_REQ.PDF. See also CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA RENEWABLES
PORTFOLIO STANDARD: QUARTERLY REPORT: 2ND QUARTER 2011, supra note 119.
170
See generally CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CPUC-CEC COLLABORATIVE STAFF DATA
REQUEST, supra note 169.
171
See CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DECISION, supra note 116.
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Bills (AB): SB 679 172 (added as Section 26142 to the Public Resources
Code, on financial assistance for energy conservation projects); SB
790 173 (proposing to amend and add Sections to the Public Utilities
Code, on community choice aggregation programs); SB 489 174 (amended
and repealing sections of the Public Utilities Code, on net energy
metering); and SB 836 175 (adding Section 911 to the Public Utilities
Code, on cost reporting for renewable energy resources). 176 SB 679
appropriates $250,000 for the CEC to use to provide loans to eligible
local government and public institutions for the installation of DG
renewable energy sources and other energy conservation projects. 177 This
bill provides strong support for DG because it sets money aside for DG
projects, but the allotted money may also be spent on other projects like
electric vehicle charging infrastructure. 178 SB 790 would require CPUC
to institute a rulemaking proceeding by March 1, 2012, that will address
how to govern the conduct of an electrical corporation with respect to
Community Choice Aggregation programs. 179 As defined by a prior bill,
AB 117, 180 Community Choice Aggregation “permits any city, county or
city and county to aggregate the electric loads of residents, businesses
and municipal facilities to facilitate the purchase and sale of electrical
energy.” 181 This has some potential for promoting DG programs within
cities, but it is lacking the coordinating policy that would permit more
residents, businesses, and municipal facilities to actually generate their
own electricity via DG. 182
Some California legislation promotes DG by expanding definitions

172

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 26142.
Senate Bill No. 790, available at www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_07510800/sb_790_bill_20111008_chaptered.pdf. See also Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 331.1, 365.1, 366.2,
380, 381.1, 395.5, 396.5, 707, 3260 (Westlaw 2012).
174
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2827, 2827.10, 2827.5, 2827.9 (Westlaw 2012).
175
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 911 (Westlaw 2012).
176
CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, 2011 CALIFORNIA ENERGY LEGISLATION (Oct. 12, 2011,
8:15PM), energycenter.org/index.php/policy-a-planning/california-legislation/2509-2011-californiaenergy-legislation.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
The California Public Utilities Commission was issued a memorandum from the Office of
Governmental Affairs on May 23, 2011, with a Legislative Subcommittee Recommendation to
oppose the bill unless it was amended (see www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/57D333D1-9A22-45F6891D-25473AE98FB6/0/SB_790_Leg_Memo_5_26_Comm_Agenda.pdf). The CPUC ruled in favor
of this recommendation, and the bill was returned for amendments. At the time that this article went
to press, there was no update on the progress of this bill.
180
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 218.3, 366, 394, 394.25, 331.1, 366.2, 381.1 (Westlaw 2012).
181
LOCAL
GOV’T
COMM’N,
COMMUNITY
CHOICE
AGGREGATION,
www.lgc.org/cca/what_is_cca.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
182
Id.
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and altering reporting requirements under existing statutes. SB 489, 183
for example, revises the definition of an “eligible customer-generator” to
require that the generator must utilize renewable sources in order to
qualify for the CEC’s Renewable Energy Resources Program. 184 This bill
benefits DG by requiring such generators to be powered by wind, solar,
or geothermal conductors. 185 SB 836 186 requires the CPUC to release
data to the Legislature every six months for all costs that the CPUC
approves for the utilities’ electricity procurement contracts. This bill
increases transparency of the utilities’ activities, which enables the
legislature to shape future policy to ensure that the utilities fulfill their
obligations for renewables. 187 Similarly, SB 585 188 (amending Section
2851 and adding Section 2851.1 to the Public Utilities Code) adds $200
million to the cost limit for CPUC’s California Solar Initiative
program. 189 The bill also requires the CPUC to “establish and impose
project cost caps for residential projects under the California Solar
initiative, based on national and state installed cost data,” which has the
potential of encouraging more small-scale DG projects that are
inherently less costly than large-scale projects. 190
Even though these bills have some potential, the majority of
California’s energy legislation promulgates the existing infrastructure
with support for fossil fuels and large-scale renewable energy projects
that fail to generate the same benefits of small-scale renewable energy
DG. 191 There are also many pro-DG bills that never make it out of their
house of origin because their hearings are cancelled by their authors. 192
One of the most promising DG proposals of 2011, AB 1302, 193 would
have required utilities to identify and designate zones for DG projects
and thereafter make those DG projects priorities for completion by the
utilities. 194 Several attempts were made at amending this bill, but its
author cancelled its hearing, and it has not seen any legislative action
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CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2827, 2827.10, 2827.5, 2827.9 (Westlaw 2012).
See CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, supra note 176.
185
Id.
186
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 911 (Westlaw 2012).
187
See CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, supra note 176.
188
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2851.1, 2851.1 (Westlaw 2012).
189
See CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, supra note 176.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. (showing bills that were cancelled by their authors before hearings were scheduled,
irrespective of reason for cancellation).
193
AB
1302,
available
at
www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_13011350/ab_1302_bill_20110527_amended_asm_v95.pdf (Feb. 13, 2011) (as last amended).
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See CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, supra note 176.
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since then. 195 Meanwhile, some chaptered bills exhibit anti-DG
sentiment within the legislature. One example is AB 512 196 (amending
Section 2830 of the Public Utilities Code), which disqualifies local
governments from being eligible for supplying renewable energy
generation to an electrical corporation. 197
The passage of bills that discourage DG, coupled with the
cancellation of bills that encourage DG, illustrates the general lack of
persuasiveness that DG promoters have in the legislature. Recently, DG
bills in the California Legislature have been sidelined for bills that focus
on pipeline safety. 198 The San Bruno explosion in 2011 caused an
immediate shift in legislative focus to address safety needs. 199 While this
shift is understandable, it only promotes the continuation of our outdated,
fossil-fuel-driven infrastructure by updating the use of oil pipelines,
when we could be focused on moving away from the use of fossil fuels
by replacing pipelines with high-tech renewable energy resources.
Despite a relative stalemate in the legislature, various organizations
outside the regulatory realm have come to DG’s defense. 200 Although
these organizations do not possess regulatory control, their reports draw
attention to the benefits offered by DG and even propose legislation and
frameworks for DG. 201
In June 2011, the Clean Coalition, a California-based environmental
advocacy group, released a report on distributed generation and the smart
grid, highlighting the energy infrastructure’s need for “significant
interconnection reform.” 202 The report revealed the Clean Coalition’s
legislative and regulatory reform program, its “D-Grid Vision.” 203 The
plan has six main components, which are as follows:
(1) Viewing the grid as a two-way system so that grid planning should
expect and encourage the delivery of electricity from renewable
distributed generation resources; (2) Requiring utilities to create longterm distribution grid upgrade and investment plans that are
transparent and that hold utilities accountable for investing in ways
that maximize the ratepayer’s investment in a DG system; (3)

195

Id. (establishing cancelled status of bill).
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2830 (Westlaw 2012).
197
See CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, supra note 176.
198
Id. (showing a heavy focus on legislation that promotes pipeline safety).
199
Id.
200
See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 73; SOLAR DONE RIGHT, solardoneright.org/ (last visited Jan.
20, 2012). Both these organizations are discussed in further detail in the following paragraphs.
201
Id.
202
LEWIS, supra note 73.
203
Id. at 19-20.
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Providing public access to grid data with detailed, regularly-updated
information; (4) Identifying DG “priority zones” where interconnected
DG best benefits consumers and provides economic benefits such as
energy supply that is close to the point of demand, a decrease in new
investments once systems are implemented, and an improved
resilience of the DG-grid; (5) Including interconnection costs in the
rate base for D-grid systems; and (6) Requiring interconnection
processes to be fully transparent and for utilities to be held
accountable to timelines and other required compliance. 204

While the program has its merits, it, like most existing DG
programs, is not without flaws. The Clean Coalition sends a mixed
message by asking the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
to issue a declaratory order that gives the states jurisdiction over D-grid
interconnections (which FERC, for the most part, already has the broad
jurisdiction to do under 42 U.S.C. Section 7172) 205 while simultaneously
asking FERC to be the agency to hold utilities accountable for meeting
deadlines and transparency requirements. 206 This power struggle would
inevitably cause conflicts, resulting in deadlock between the state and
federal levels and bringing otherwise promising projects to a halt. In the
end, the Clean Coalition’s program creates a similar set-up for failure,
much like the one that exists in the current model for DG planning. 207
However, the Clean Coalition’s proffered “proactive interconnection
process” is fast and transparent, which would be a drastic improvement
over the reactive process that is currently in place. 208 This shift from
reactive to proactive procedure would put the power in the appropriate
hands, enabling DG to be maximized. 209 While the Clean Coalition’s
program is not perfect, it could serve as a great foundation for the future
of DG. 210
Solar Done Right is another proactive, pro-DG organization. 211
Represented by a team of public land activists, solar power and electrical
engineering experts, and other environmental activists, Solar Done Right
supports the maximization of DG in cities and fights against the largescale solar projects that threaten the nation’s remaining wild-lands. 212
204

LEWIS, supra note 73, at 33-38.
42 U.S.C. § 7172 (Westlaw 2012).
206
LEWIS, supra note 73, at 17.
207
Id. at 17.
208
Id. at 6.
209
Id. at 6.
210
Id. at 17.
211
See SOLAR DONE RIGHT, supra note 200.
212
See SOLAR DONE RIGHT, ABOUT US, solardoneright.org/index.php/site/about/ (last visited
Aug. 9, 2012).
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The organization proposes a priority of strategies to end the nation’s
addiction to fossil fuels and reliance on large-scale generation plants. 213
The first step is reducing national demand and consumption via a
combination of conservation and energy efficiency. 214 The second step in
the switch would be for homes and businesses to “generate renewable
energy at or near the point of use,” that is, with distributed generation. 215
The final stage of this switchover is to maximize the use of DG by
generating renewable energy via DG on larger scale within the existing
environment of cities and the use of a smart grid. 216 Solar Done Right’s
“how to do solar right” approach encourages the same maximization of
DG that has been promoted throughout this Comment. The organization
is currently petitioning to have their policies for DG integration, as well
as those aimed at stopping large-scale development on precious wildlands, adopted by legislation. 217 This approach sheds a lot of light on the
harsh environmental impacts that large-scale solar projects have on
delicate habitats. 218 In an effort to protect these habitats, Solar Done
Right encourages the use of the existing infrastructure—rooftops of
buildings, parking structures, manufacturing plants—for renewable
energy generation. 219 This poses far less risk to the environment and
provides a source of energy that is closest to the point of consumption. 220
Solar Done Right provides foundational support for jumpstarting a
comprehensive policy transformation that centers on DG.
Overall, California’s foundational energy framework and legislation
provide great footing for a major distributed generation movement that
could thereafter be applied across the nation. By adjusting a few key DG
policies and adopting the ideas of organizations like the Clean Coalition
and Solar Done Right, California has enormous potential for making
distributed generation a successful means of renewable energy
production.
VI. CHANGING THE SYSTEM USING INTERNATIONAL MODELS OF
SUCCESS
Several other countries have already begun the transition to DG

213

Id.
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
See SOLAR DONE RIGHT, supra note 200.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
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energy economies. 221 Germany in particular has one of the most
progressive energy infrastructures in the world. 222 Germany produces
twenty percent of its electricity from renewable energy, fifty-one percent
of which is owned by citizens or farms. 223 These distributed generation
investments represent $100 billion worth of private investments in clean
energy. 224 Following a sixty percent increase in its solar output in
2011, 225 Germany has seventeen gigawatts (GW) of solar installation,
compared to the 3.6 GW of solar that the United States currently has
installed. 226
Germany’s success is a curious phenomenon, especially considering
that technology and greater sunlight exposure make American panels
nearly one-third cheaper than their German counterparts. 227 The leading
reason why the United States lags behind Germany is policy.228 Germany
has strong pro-DG policy, which is driven by Germans’ political will to
maximize efficiency, sustainability, and clean energy throughout the
country. 229 Germans have embraced the notion that how people generate
energy is a choice, as is the choice to not pollute the air with fossil-fuelbased energies. 230 Through legislation, Germany is empowering its
citizens with a democratic choice of source of energy and the ability to
contribute to the country’s energy production. 231 Germany’s recently
revised feed-in-tariff (FIT) policies require utilities to connect every
renewable energy producer—big or small—to the grid and to purchase
221

See KEMA, INC., DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN EUROPE—PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION CONNECTION
(Apr.
29,
2011),
available
at
www.energy.ca.gov/2011_energypolicy/documents/2011-0509_workshop/documents/Memo%201_Physical%20Infrastructure%20and%20DG%20Interconnecti
on.pdf (primarily discussing Spain and Germany).
222
See Mat McDermott, 20% of Germany’s Electricity Now Comes from Renewable Energy,
TREE HUGGER (Sept. 6, 2011), www.treehugger.com/renewable-energy/20-of-germanys-electricitynow-comes-from-renewable-energy.html (noting that Germany has impressive growth in renewable
energy and that the country’s feed-in-tariff program is the best in the world).
223
Mat McDermott, Over Half of Germany’s Renewable Energy Owned by Citizens &
Farmers, Not Utility Companies, TREE HUGGER (Jan. 6, 2012), www.treehugger.com/renewableenergy/over-half-germany-renewable-energy-owned-citizens-not-utility-companies.html.
224
Id.
225
Mat McDermott, Germany’s Solar Power Output Up 60% in 2011, TREE HUGGER (Dec.
29,
2011),
www.treehugger.com/renewable-energy/german-solar-output-increases-60-percent2011.html.
226
McDermott, Over Half of Germany’s Renewable Energy Owned by Citizens & Farmers,
Not Utility Companies, supra note 223.
227
LEWIS, supra note 73, at 10.
228
McDermott, 20% of Germany’s Electricity Now Comes from Renewable Energy, supra
note 222.
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all producers’ output at a flat, attractive rate that is held steady by a longterm contract. 232 In addition to these FIT policies, Germany recently
adopted a DG policy aptly named eigenverbrauch, or “own
consumption,” which raises the cost of self-generated energy in an effort
to force consumers to conserve energy and not let any surplus energy go
to waste. 233 This type of DG-specific legislation is the driving force that
is enabling Germany to reform its energy infrastructure and reach these
impressive numbers of renewable energy and distributed generation.
Germany’s progressive policy demonstrates the degree of success that is
achievable by a country with the right mindset. 234
In order to maximize the benefits offered by distributed generation,
we can start by following Germany’s progressive, democratic approach.
The appropriate modification would be to empower consumers to have
more of a say in how they can and will contribute to the D-grid, which is
effectively made up of many individuals within a community. This
method is supported by Solar Done Right’s strategies for change in
Distributed Solar PV: Why It Should be the Centerpiece of U.S. Solar
Energy. 235 Solar Done Right recognizes that encouraging individual
participation is not accomplished by allowing the IOUs to retain control
over the system because individuals are not likely to submit to IOUs’
control of the power they are generating. 236 Instead, those who will be
contributing energy via distributed generation should control the system,
thereby making the system more democratic in nature and thus more
receptive to change. 237 When customers meet their own demand, they are
quicker to respond to problems within their own system. Additionally, by
diversifying points of generation, the failure of one generator would not
cause blackouts across an entire city, which is often what happens under
the current infrastructure. 238
The necessary shift in the infrastructure should start with a change
in the relationship between the IOUs and the state regulatory agencies.
By shifting control from the IOUs to the state agencies CPUC, CEC, and
CARB, DG-favorable programs on both sides of the meter can be
expanded to provide bigger and better incentives to the individual.

232

Craig Morris, The Future of German FITs, RENEWABLES INT’L (July 19, 2010), available
at www.renewablesinternational.net/the-future-of-german-fits/150/523/28456/.
233
Id.
234
See generally PAUL RUNCI, UNIV. OF MD., RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY IN GERMANY,
PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY TECHNICAL LAB REPORT PNWD-3526 (Jan. 2005),
available at www.globalchange.umd.edu/energytrends/germany/.
235
POWERS ET AL., supra note 16.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
See Part I. Introduction, herein, for examples.
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Unfortunately, these agencies are limited by what they can offer because
of the degree of the IOUs’ control over the grid. 239 By reducing or
eliminating the IOUs’ control, the agencies will regain their vested
authority, at which point they will able to reconfigure and simplify the
application process. Additionally, agencies could expand current
programs or introduce new ones to allow even more people to apply. As
of 2012, CPUC oversees only two incentive programs on the customer
side of the meter, known as the California Solar Initiative and the SelfGeneration Incentive Program (SGIP). 240 On the utility side, CPUC
oversees several programs for wholesale distributed generation (WDG)
that handle the net export of WDG-created electricity onto the electrical
system side of the customer’s electric meter. 241 These programs include
the Feed-in-Tariff Small Renewable Energy Generators Program under
the RPS, the Combined Heat and Power Tariff Program, and Utility PV
programs for IOU-owned PV generation. 242 Programs like these, with the
added support of policies akin to Germany’s DG policies, present strong
potential for maximizing DG within cities. 243
California’s customer-side DG programs are a good starting point
for energy renovation, but each could use its own reform. CPUC’s
California Solar Initiative, which provides upfront incentives to electric
utility customers who install solar systems on their home, business, and
public sites, must be done specifically through the California Solar
Initiative program. 244 SGIP provides upfront incentives to customers
who utilize wind turbines, fuel cells, or energy storage systems for these
systems through the program. 245 Although potentially beneficial, these
two programs only cover the bare minimum, are extremely narrow in
scope, and require customers to complete a carefully scrutinized process
before they can begin generating their own power. 246 CEC also has DG
programs, including the New Solar Homes Programs and the Emerging
Renewables Program. 247 The New Solar Homes Programs is a sister to
CPUC’s California Solar Initiative and provides incentives for new
residential construction that implement solar into building plans. 248
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CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, WHO’S WHO, supra note 124.
CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 56.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
RUNCI, supra note 234. The combination of programs like these could be used to
maximize DG within cities.
244
CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 56.
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CEC’s Emerging Renewables Program provides incentives for wind and
fuel cell systems that generate less than thirty MW. 249 While these
agencies technically oversee these programs, the customers are within
the jurisdiction of and thus subject to some control by PG&E, SDG&E,
and SCE. 250 Frustratingly, deals made between the IOUs and FERC are
beyond the scope of the three state agencies’ control, even though they
are the ones supposedly responsible for regulating the utility services and
infrastructure. 251 It is a system fraught with flaws that gives too much
bargaining power to the utilities, leaving too little in the hands of
consumers. 252
The big question is what must FERC and the three state agencies do
to make the system better suited for DG programs? First, FERC and
federal power should be limited to making legislation consistent across
the nation so that DG providers can reach multiple markets without
encountering inconsistencies between markets. National models would
provide DG a better chance for success, because developers of smallscale renewables and generators would not have to drastically change
their business models for each and every state. By requiring more
transparency of models and ordering frequent updates, FERC could
enable cities to model their own systems based on the successes and
shortcomings of other cities. Improving the transparency of and
increasing the available information about the interconnection process
will make the process simpler, faster, and easier for consumers to use.
After all, one of the biggest drawbacks of the current system is that it is
not user-friendly, which turns otherwise interested consumers away from
applying for DG systems. Reforming these rules and regulations will
vastly improve the relationship between ratepayers and utilities, thus
making our energy infrastructure fit better with the localized and
democratic values that Americans hold dear. These values will be useful
in guiding our nation’s response to the global crises of climate change
and an ever-urbanizing world.
Several respected individuals recognize the need for a shift in
power. Among them are President of the Foundation on Economic
Trends, Jeremy Rifkin, 253 and Founder and CEO of the Empowerment
Institute, David Gershon. 254 In the interest of empowering individuals,
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Id.
251
Id.
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OFFICE OF JEREMY RIFKIN, FOUND. ON ECON. TRENDS, www.foet.org/JeremyRifkin.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
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See GERSHON, supra note 93.
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these two men promote democracy and social change, both of which
apply directly to the idea of empowering ratepayers with DG. In The
Third Industrial Revolution, Rifkin encourages Americans to maximize
the use of clean energy in urban models in the interest of promoting
sustainability. 255 In the interest of our future, society must move away
from the age-old Industrial Era to a modern, sustainable “Collaborative
Era.” 256 Rifkin believes that, by concentrating our efforts on
implementing renewables into our power grids and creating a lateral
power structure, we can leave behind the industrial past and enter into an
era of democracy and entrepreneurship, where collaboration can enable
sustainability to sweep the globe. 257 We can shift from an era that has
long emphasized the top-down flow of authority and the importance of
financial capital to an era that honors “creative play, peer-to-peer
interactivity, social capital, participation in open commons, and access to
global networks.” 258 By using renewable energy distributed generation in
our cities, we can achieve higher energy production, maximize
sustainability, and create self-sufficient communities that are no longer
dependent on far away, large-scale and overly powerful utility
companies. 259 With a shift in focus to democracy and social change,
America has great potential to make DG work in cities across the
country. Rifkin’s model “favors lateral ventures, both in social commons
and in the market place, on the assumption that mutual interest, pursued
jointly, is the best route to a sustainable economic development.” 260
Establishing a democratic structure is only half the battle, as
implementation of the new laws requires the support of the people.
Initiating the requisite behavioral change can and will come only with
inspirational policy that gives people the power to enforce a new
framework. 261 Addressing this complex challenge requires sociological
expertise from individuals like David Gershon, who suggests methods
for behavioral change and large system transformation in his latest book,
Social Change 2.0. 262 First and foremost, it is necessary to close the gap
between passed legislation and implemented legislation by changing
urban behavior. Gershon advocates blending top-down policy change
255

See RIFKIN, supra note 11, at intro.
Id. at 259–60.
257
Id. at 126.
258
Id. at 259.
259
Id. at 55 (quoting Neelie Kroes, the EU commissioner responsible for competition policy,
who favors a move toward “structural unbundling (i.e., separation of the supply and retail business
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with bottom-up social change in a creative, synergistic way that
maximizes change. 263 It is important to recognize that traditional
methods will not work for such progressive plans, so we have to think
outside the box before change can occur. 264 Social engagement based on
connection, cooperation, collaboration, and an emphasis on community
empowers people and implements policy in a one-two punch. 265 For a
working model, we can look to Gershon’s Cool City Challenge, for
which the Empowerment Institute is working with three American cities
and three Brazilian neighborhoods to achieve dramatic carbon reduction,
vibrant livability, and green prosperity. 266 The chosen cities were
announced at the June 2012 RIO+20 Climate Conference, and the results
of the project will be announced at the 2016 Rio Olympics. 267 These
projects will encourage individual involvement in renewable energy on a
local, community level to build momentum for a wide-sweeping
systemic change. The Cool City Challenge can be studied for the
implementation of the wide-sweeping change proffered by this
Comment. After all, change will not occur in a democratic society
without societal support.
VII. CONCLUSION
America’s outdated and vulnerable energy infrastructure is in
desperate need of reform, one that can end our reliance on fossil fuels
and enable American cities to become self-sustaining with localized,
renewable energy distributed generation. With sustainability and
democracy as our social motivators, we can bolster California’s DG
legislation with successful policies like Germany’s FIT and “own
consumption” laws. California has enormous potential to be the
frontrunner in a national movement to make our energy infrastructure
more reliable in the face of natural disasters and better suited for the
urban habitat that so many call home. For nations around the globe,
distributed generation has the ability to equalize power between utilities
and ratepayers, between the government and the people, and perhaps
most importantly, between the people and the Earth.
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and will be used to “scale up the Cool Community model and become global ‘teaching cities.’”
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VII. TABLE OF ACRONYMS
Basic Terms
DG: Distributed Generation
WDG: Wholesale Distributed Generation
D-Grid: Distribution Grid
T-Grid: Transmission Grid
Federal and State Energy Agencies
FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
CPUC: California Public Utilities Commission
CEC: California Energy Commission
CARB: California Air Resources Board
IOUs: Investor-Owned Utilities
PG&E: Pacific Gas & Electric
SDG&E: San Diego Gas & Electric
SCE: Southern California Edison
Policies and Programs
RPS: Renewable Portfolio Standard
FIT: Feed-in-Tariffs
EPACT: Energy Policy Act of 2005
PURPA: Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978
CSI: California Solar Initiative
SGIP: Self-Generation Incentive Program
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